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Policy Conclusions: In Brief 
1. The EU should establish a new EU supervisory Copenhagen mechanism assessing member 
states’ compliance with rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy. The mechanism 
should be a monitoring arm, complementing the current preventive and corrective ones of 
Article 7 TEU. It would consist of a periodic evaluation or scoreboard of member states’ 
compliance with Article 2 TEU. No Treaty change would be required. The Commission 
should coordinate the process. European Council Conclusions should be adopted offering an 
EU inter-institutional agreement on its features and operability. 
2. The Copenhagen Mechanism should be nurtured by independent academic expertise to 
ensure impartiality and scientific quality backing up EU level evaluation. This would lead to 
qualitative comparative assessments of member states with due consideration to their 
domestic constitutional traditions, and the findings from other non-EU bodies assessing rule 
of law in Europe such as the UN and the Council of Europe.  
3. In a longer-term perspective, other steps could be taken yet requiring Treaty change. The 
activation phase of the Copenhagen Mechanism could be improved by liberalising the 
current in threshold Article 7 TEU. The margin of manoeuvre by the Council should be 
more balanced with increasing Parliament accountability. The Court of Justice of the EU 
should also be involved both in the preventive and penalty dimensions.  
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Introduction: The Copenhagen dilemma 
The European Union, and its Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ), is founded on a set of 
common principles of rule of law, democracy 
and human rights. This has been officially 
enshrined in the body of Article 2 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) which lists “respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities” as the 
shared values on which the Union is rooted. One 
of the current modalities of action to ensure that 
all member states of the EU respect Article 2 TEU 
is to filter their compliance with these values 
before they accede to the Union. The so-called 
‘Copenhagen criteria’ have been established in 
1993 to ensure that all new EU member states are 
in line with the Union’s common principles 
before crossing the bridge towards membership.  
That notwithstanding, no similar method or 
instrument exists to supervise the respect of 
these same principles after accession. This has 
been referred to by Vice-President of the 
European Commission Viviane Reding as the 
“Copenhagen dilemma”, which she describes as 
follows: “Once this Member State has joined the 
European Union, we appear not to have any 
instrument to see whether the rule of law and the 
independence of the judiciary still command respect”.
1 
This dilemma was reaffirmed by President of the 
European Commission José Manuel Barroso, in 
his latest State of the Union, when he confirmed 
the need to better safeguard the EU’s rule of law 
values
2  and called for a robust European 
mechanism to influence the equation when basic 
common principles are at stake. 
Recent events in Europe have indeed underlined 
the fundamental gap affecting the ‘Copenhagen 
filtering’ after accession. The Roma crises in 
France in 2010-13, the constitutional 
controversies in Hungary from the end of 2011 
and in Romania in the summer of 2012 are only 
few examples of incidents illustrating systemic 
                                                      
1 European Parliament (2012), Plenary debate on the 
political situation in Romania, statement by V. 
Reding, 12 September 2012. See also V. Reding, “The 
EU and the Rule of Law: What Next?”, speech 
delivered at CEPS, 4 September 2013. 
2 J. M. Durão Barroso, State of the Union 2013, 11 
September 2013 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-684_en.htm).  
rule of law deficiencies in the Union. More 
recently, the alleged mass surveillance of EU 
citizens by the British GCHQ intelligence service 
in collaboration with the United States NSA, or 
the destruction by The Guardian of evidence on 
request of the British government, have also 
been regarded to be in fundamental tension with 
democratic rule of law and fundamental rights.  
All these rule of law crises have revealed 
that the respect of fundamental rights by 
member states cannot be taken for granted. 
1. Mapping treaty provisions and EU 
policy instruments protecting rule of 
law, fundamental rights and 
democracy 
The CEPS e-book The Triangular Relationship 
shows that the EU is already a rule-of-law actor 
relying on a set of policy and legal instruments 
assessing (to varying degrees) member states’ 
compliance with rule of law, fundamental rights 
and democracy under the current treaty 
configurations.  
There is in fact a multi-level and multi-actor 
European framework of existing legal and policy 
instruments dealing – directly or indirectly – 
with these issues. They constitute a scattered and 
patchy setting of member states’ EU surveillance 
systems as regards their obligations enshrined in 
Article 2 TEU and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. These instruments also 
show variable degrees of proximity to the 
treaties. Some are expressly stipulated in treaty 
provisions and others only present indirect 
linkages with EU primary law. There are also 
instruments that have no strong legal foundation 
but fall in the field of soft methods of 
‘experimental’ governance.  
…the EU is already a rule of law actor 
equipped with a set of policy and legal 
instruments assessing member states’ 
compliance with rule of law under the 
current Treaties. 
The only Treaty-based supervisory instrument in 
the hands of European institutions to monitor 
member states’ rule of law compliance has never 
been used in practice. Article 7 TEU states that if 
there is a serious and persistent breach by a 
member state of the values referred to in Article 
2, this member state might be sanctioned and be 
suspended from voting at Council level.  RULE OF LAW OR RULE OF THUMB? | 3 
 
This provision confers powers on the European 
Commission to monitor fundamental rights in 
the EU and identify potential risks. Article 7 
consists of a preventive arm (determining a clear 
risk of a breach) and a corrective arm 
(determining a serious and persistent breach).
3 A 
central point here is that the scope of application 
is not only limited to member states’ actions 
when implementing EU law, but also covers 
breaches in areas where they act autonomously.  
Article 7, which has been misleadingly labelled 
‘the nuclear option’, has never been activated in 
practice. Several reasons have played a role here, 
most importantly the lack of EU inter-
institutional consensus on the conditions for its 
practical operability as well as its inherently 
political nature and the large room of discretion 
left to the Council in determining that there is a 
clear risk or in determining that there is a serious 
or persistent breach, as well as on the application 
of penalties. 
Article 7 TEU has not been applied 
effectively in practice due to a number of 
political and legal obstacles. 
There are other EU-level instruments evaluating 
and monitoring (yet not directly supervising) 
Article 2-related principles at member-state 
levels. These include for instance the 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) 
for Bulgaria and Romania,
4 the recently adopted 
                                                      
3 See also European Commission (2003), 
Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on 
European Union - Respect for and promotion of the 
values on which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 
final, 15 October 2003. 
4 See contribution by Ivanova in CEPS e-book. See 
also European Commission (2006) Decision 
establishing a mechanism for cooperation and 
verification of progress in Bulgaria to address specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the 
fight against corruption and organised crime, C(2006) 
6570 final, Brussels, 13 December 2006; as well as 
European Commission (2006) Decision establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and verification of 
progress in Romania to address specific benchmarks 
in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against 
corruption and organised crime, C(2006) 6569 final, 
Brussels, 13 December 2006 (refer to 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm) 
EU Justice Scoreboard,
5 the upcoming EU Anti-
Corruption Report
6 as well as the Annual 
Reports on Fundamental Rights published 
periodically by the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Fundamental 
Rights Agency (FRA).
7  
These mechanisms, however, present a number 
of methodological challenges affecting their 
effectiveness. First they are experimental 
governance techniques which constitute soft-
policy (non-legally binding) tools or 
coordination methods making use of 
benchmarking techniques, exchange of ‘good 
practices’ and mutual learning processes 
between member states. They are affected by 
politicisation and make use of non-neutral and 
subjective evaluation methodologies. Some of 
them even defy the EU inter-institutional balance 
and challenge the ways in which EU decision- 
making is supposed to take place following the 
wording of the EU treaties. Particular issues of 
concern include f democratic accountability and 
judicial control gaps, with a limited or non-
existent role for the European Parliament and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, and a 
lack of coherency with other existing EU 
legislative and policy frameworks in the same 
fields.
8 
                                                      
5 European Commission (2013), The EU Justice 
Scoreboard – A tool to promote effective justice and 
growth, COM(2013) 160 final, Brussels, 27 March. 
6 European Commission (2011), Decision establishing 
an EU Anti-corruption reporting mechanism for 
periodic assessment ("EU Anti-corruption Report"), 
C(2011) 3673 final, Brussels, 6 June 2011. Refer also to 
European Commission, Communication on Fighting 
Corruption in the EU, COM(2011) 308 final, 6.6.2011, 
Brussels. 
7 For a detailed overview of the scope and 
components of each of these instruments, refer to 
chapter 2 of the CEPS e-book and Annex 1 on 
Mapping of current instruments at EU level 
evaluating or monitoring fundamental rights and rule 
of law aspects.  
8 Similar concerns have been raised in the field of EU 
economic policy coordination. See J. Mortensen 
(2013), “Economic Policy Coordination in the 
Economic and Monetary Union: From Maastricht via 
the SGP to the Fiscal Pact”, CEPS Working Document 
No. 381, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
August; and to the contribution by Cinzia Alcidi and 
Matthias Busse in the Annex to the CEPS e-book. 4 | CARRERA, GUILD & HERNANZ 
2. What does rule of law mean? 
A second challenge facing any rule-of-law debate 
at EU level relates to its conceptual vagueness. 
What exactly does rule of law mean? The notion of 
rule of law is an elusive and controversial one. 
The European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (the Venice Commission) of the 
Council of Europe has provided one of the few 
widely accepted conceptual frameworks for rule 
of law in Europe, and it represents a helpful 
starting point.
9 According to the latter, rule of 
law is first and foremost directed at state 
authorities – those who make and apply the law.  
The thematic contributions composing the CEPS 
e-book have revealed that there is an 
‘embeddedness’ of this term with specific 
national historical diversities of a political, 
institutional, legal and imaginary nature. 
Concepts such as for instance Rechtsstaat in 
Germany, état de droit in France, rule of law in 
the UK or pravova darjava in Bulgaria are far from 
being synonymous and present distinctive 
features, including their relations with the other 
notions of democracy and fundamental rights. 
The material scoping of rule of law in member 
states’ arenas, and its linkages with the other two 
criteria, remain also ever-shifting and are 
therefore difficult to capture from a normative 
viewpoint. 
However, while acknowledging these conceptual 
divergences, the CEPS e-book argues that any 
future rule of law-related policy discussion in the 
EU should start from an understanding of the 
triangular relationship between these 
dimensions from the perspective of ‘democratic 
rule of law with fundamental rights’, i.e. the 
legally based rule of a democratic state that 
delivers fundamental rights. The relationship 
among the rule of law, fundamental rights and 
democracy is co-constitutive. Like the three legs 
of a stool, if one is missing the whole is not fit for 
purpose. States can comply with rule of law 
without actually being democracies, i.e. 
anchored on the principles of an association of 
self-governing free and equal citizens and 
                                                      
9 European Commission for Democracy through the 
Law (Venice Commission), Report on the Rule of 
Law, Strasbourg, 4 April 2011, Study No. 512/2009, 
Council of Europe (see 
www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation
for more information on the Venice Commission). 
upholding fundamental human rights 
protection. The three criteria are in this way 
inherently and indivisibly interconnected, and 
interdependent on each of the others, and they 
cannot be separated without inflicting profound 
damage to the whole and changing its essential 
shape and configuration. 
Any debate at EU level on how to 
strengthen member states’ compliance 
with Article 2 TEU should start from the 
perspective of democratic rule of law with 
fundamental rights. 
3. Who should be responsible for 
protecting rule of law in the EU? 
The full content of the concept of rule of law 
remains therefore largely unresolved. Yet, in the 
current state of affairs in the EU, much of the 
contestation around rule of law is a form of 
displaced state-sovereignty struggles. When 
bringing the EU into the intersection between 
rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights, 
profound sovereignty struggles emerge, which 
lie at the basis of the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’.  
While European institutions continue stressing 
the importance of the primacy of EU law and 
hence call upon member states to comply with 
their obligations and loyal cooperation in the 
scope of the EU Treaties and Article 2 TEU, 
member state governments in turn counter this 
version of ‘rule of law’ with principles of 
subsidiarity and national sovereignty. An 
additional controversial question affecting these 
debates has been therefore whether these are 
issues ‘within the remits’ of EU intervention 
under the current Treaties. 
The actual challenge behind ‘the 
Copenhagen dilemma’ is one related to the 
struggles over competence and sovereignty 
between the EU and national 
governments. 
As stated above, the Union is already a rule-of-
law actor. All three principles – fundamental 
rights, rule of law and democracy – are inherent 
to the EU through the treaties and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
development of the European legal system and 
its evolving fundamental rights acquis have 
transformed the traditional venues of 
accountability which used to reside within the 
exclusive remit of the nation-liberal democratic RULE OF LAW OR RULE OF THUMB? | 5 
 
member states of the Union. It has added a 
supra-national constellation of rule of law.  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is now a 
constitutive component of the national 
constitutional traditions o f  E U  m e m b e r  s t a t e s ,  
with national judges increasingly using it in 
domestic rulings in matters showing no direct 
correlation with EU law. The national 
constitutional traditions covered by our research 
show a surprising ‘degree of convergence’ that 
has emerged at the member state level, and the 
‘processes of constitutionalisation’ of the EU 
Charter and European human rights framework 
in the member states’ domestic legal systems. 
This calls for a strengthened role for the EU in 
monitoring, evaluating and/or supervising the 
triangular relationship between rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights by its 
member states.  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
is now a constitutive component of the 
national constitutional traditions of 
member states. 
4. Conclusions: A New Copenhagen 
Mechanism for the EU 
The EU should therefore establish a new all-
encompassing EU supervisory mechanism in 
order to address the dilemmas characterising the 
relationship between fundamental rights, 
democracy and rule of law in the EU, which 
could be named the ‘Copenhagen Mechanism’. If 
legal principles such as democracy, rule of law 
and fundamental rights are so important as to be 
listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on European 
Union, how is it possible that no EU monitoring tool 
exists to safeguard their observance? The European 
Commission currently has at its disposal several 
instruments that could be more effectively 
brought to bear against a member state even 
when they act outside the scope of EU law or 
‘autonomously’, without the need of any Treaty 
change.  
In light of the above, the following policy 
recommendations are put forward: 
1. The new Copenhagen Mechanism should be a 
monitoring arm, complementing the 
preventive and corrective arms of the Article 
7 TEU instrument.
10 This monitoring arm 
would consist of a periodic evaluation or 
scoreboard of member states’ compliance 
with Article 2 TEU principles. No treaty 
change would be required to develop this EU 
mechanism. As guardian of the treaties, the 
European Commission (DG Justice) would be 
the perfect candidate to lead the process of 
evaluation of democracy, rule of law and 
fundamental rights at member-state level.  
2. A new Commission Communication should 
carefully outline and develop these conditions 
and procedures to ensure a more effective 
operability of this important mechanism. The 
Communication should be the basis for 
European Council Conclusions and an EU 
inter-institutional agreement on European 
guidelines for improving Article 7 TEU 
operability and effectiveness. 
3. Methodologically, the Copenhagen 
Mechanism and the scoreboard should be 
mainly based on external independent 
academic expertise so as to ensure 
impartiality in the evaluation of politically 
sensitive matters, leading to qualitative 
comparative assessments of EU member 
states taking due consideration of their 
domestic specificities and constitutional 
traditions and practices. The use of 
benchmarking should be limited and taken 
with caution as this methodology is affected 
by unresolved methodological dilemmas 
related to politicisation, lack of neutrality and 
accountability deficits. Parliamentary 
accountability of this new mechanism should 
be better guaranteed. The European 
Parliament would need to be given an 
important role in the debates on the results of 
the monitoring and in the recommendations 
stemming from it. 
                                                      
10 See D. Bigo, S. Carrera and E. Guild (2009), “The 
Challenge Project: Final Recommendations on the 
Changing Landscape of European Liberty and 
Security”, CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 16, 
CEPS, Brussels. See also S. Carrera, E. Guild, J. Soares 
da Silva and A. Wiesbrock (2012), “The Results of 
Inquiries into the CIA’s Programme of Extraordinary 
Rendition and Secret Prisons in European States in 
light of the New Legal Framework following the 
Lisbon Treaty”, DG IPOL, European Parliament, 
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In examining the existence of a “threat or a 
risk of serious breach” by a member state of 
Article 2 TEU principles, the Commission 
should establish institutionalised cooperation 
and formalised partnerships with non-EU 
bodies such as the United Nations; the 
Council of Europe, in particular its Venice 
Commission on the rule of law and its 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Better 
cooperation with existing networks of 
national, regional and local practitioners and 
authorities, such as those currently under the 
coordination of the European Ombudsman 
and the European Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, should be also encouraged and 
activated. 
4. The EU should launch a ‘rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights 
Copenhagen Policy Cycle’, as recommended 
in the European Parliament’s 2012 Report on 
the situation of fundamental rights,11 which 
would ensure inter-institutional coordination 
between the currently ongoing reporting 
processes related to the EU Charter and 
fundamental rights by European institutions 
and agencies. The Copenhagen Policy Cycle 
should be linked to the European Semester 
Cycle in order to ensure the exchange of 
information and cross-linkages between both 
processes. It should be inter-institutional in 
nature and involve all the relevant national 
actors, human rights bodies, national 
ombudsmen, data protection authorities and 










                                                      
11 E u r o p e a n  P a r l i a m e n t  ( 2 0 1 2 ) ,  R e s o l u t i o n  o n  t h e  
situation of fundamental rights in the EU (2010-2011), 
P7_TA(2012)0500, Rapporteur: Monika Flašíková 
Beňová, 22 November. 
5. In a longer-term perspective, other measures 
could be taken that would require an 
amendment of the current normative 
configurations delineating the EU treaties. 
The activation phase of the Copenhagen 
Mechanism in cases of alleged risk or 
existence of serious/persistent breach of 
Article 2 TEU could be improved by 
liberalising its current form and threshold, 
which remain too burdensome in practice. 
The margin of manoeuvre by the Council 
should be more balanced with increasing 
accountability by the European Parliament in 
all stages of the new supervisory process. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union 
should be involved both in the preventive and 
penalty dimensions of Article 7 TEU.  
In conclusion, the Copenhagen Mechanism is 
only one of the possible policy options available 
to EU policy-makers, but its features are essential 
in addressing the current rule of law gaps. 
Maintaining the current status quo means 
continuing to assess rule of law by rule of 
thumb. Only by having a solid, independent and 
knowledge-based monitoring tool will it be 
possible for the EU to assess whether the 
common principles such as democracy, rule of 
law and fundamental rights are still respected by 
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